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A small region has a high cost monopolistic electricity generator. It
is connected through a low capacity transmission line with a large, com-
petitive low cost region. Access to the transmission line is auctioned. I
show that, if consumers arbitrate on the regional price diﬀerences, the
monopolist will buy the transmission capacity. It is then welfare improv-
ing not to allow the monopolist to buy transmission rights. In theory, if
consumers could co-ordinate and overcome free-riding, then they would
bid more than the monopolist.
Keywords: electricity, congestion, network, monopoly
JEL Classi￿cation: D42, L12, L94
The paper tries to give some simple intuition for what happens when an
incumbent monopolist is allowed to buy import capacity. The results in this
paper are not entirely new (see for instance Joskow and Tirole, 2000), but are
￿ hopefully ￿ explained somewhat simpler.
We consider the standard two node network, with a monopoly at the im-
porting region, and a competitive market in the exporting region. Access to
the transmission line is auctioned. We study whether the consumers or the
monopolist of the importing region will buy the transmission capacity.
The model has been inspired by the situation at the French-Belgian border.
France has an overproduction of cheap nuclear power. Given the small trans-
mission capacity between France and Belgium the interconnecting transmission
lines are almost always congested. Belgian consumers are concerned that the
Belgian incumbent generator would buy all transmission capacity to keep out its
competitors. We show that this will be the case. Note that the paper assumes
that the French electricity market is competitive, which most people think is
not the case.
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Figure 1: The model considers two regions, region 1 has a high cost monopolist, and
region 2 has a low cost perfectly competitive market. Consumers in region
1 have a demand function q(p).
Set up of the model Consider two regions i ∈ {1,2}. See Figure 1. Region
1 has consumers with a demand for electricity q(p), and a monopolistic gener-
ator with a constant marginal production cost cH.R e g i o n2 has a competitive
electricity market with a constant marginal production cost cL. Production costs
are higher in region 1 than in region 2.( cH >c L). As region 2 is competitive,
its price for electricity is cL.
A transmission line with limited capacity k connects both regions. It is as-
sumed that transmission capacity is small, such that the transmission constraint
is always binding. Access to the transmission line is auctioned. To simplify the
results, it is assumed that all transmission capacity is sold in one package; i.e.
either the consumers or the monopolist end up with all the transmission rights.
The model has two stages. In the ￿rst stage, the generators or the consumers
obtain the transmission capacity, in the second stage the monopolist sets his
price for electricity.
First we look to the second stage of the game. Then we will solve the solution
of the ￿rst stage.
Second Stage We compare the two possible allocations: (1) Consumers have
all the transmission rights (Index C), and (2) The monopolist has the transmis-
sion rights. (Index M).
If consumers own the rights (See ￿gure 2), then the monopolist has a residual
2demand function p(q) − k and obtains a pro￿t:
πC(p)=( p − cH)(q(p) − k) (1)











Figure 2: Consumers own the transmission capacity. The optimal price for the mo-
nopolist is p
C.T h ea r e aB is the monopoly pro￿t, area A the consumers
surplus, and area C the value of the transmission rights for consumes who
behave as arbitrageurs.
If the monopolist owns the rights, he obtains a pro￿t
πM(p)=( p − cH) q(p)+k(cH − cL) (2)
He maximizes against the full demand function and receives a pro￿t k∆c from
importing cheap electricity. See ￿gure 3. He sets the price pM =a r gm a x p πM(p).
In ￿gure 3 the pro￿to ft h em o n o p o l i s ti st h ea r e aB0.
First Stage In stage 1, the players bid for the transmission rights. Without
specifying the actual mechanism we assume that the player with the highest
valuation receives the transmission rights. As there is perfect information in
the game, this is what happens for the standard auctions. The value of owning
the transmission right for the monopolist is V M = πM(pM) − πC(pC).I nt h e
￿g u r e st h i si sa r e aB0 − B.
The value for the consumers depends on (I) whether they will arbitrate










Figure 3: The monopolist owns the transmission capacity. The optimal price for the
monopolist is p
M.T h ea r e aB
0 is the monopoly pro￿t. Area A
0 the con-
sumers surplus.
Case I. The consumers arbitrate on the price diﬀerence. The value for
consumers of a unit of transmission rights is equal to the price diﬀerence be-
tween the regions: pC − cL. Their total valuation for k transmission rights is
V C
arbitrage =( pC − cL)k. See region C in ￿gure 2. The monopolist has a higher
valuation than the consumers
V M >VC
arbitrage (3)
The proof is simple and uses a revealed preference argument for the monopolist.
It is obvious that B +C<B 0,a so t h e r w i s epM would not be the optimal price
for the monopolist. Rearranging the terms gives C<B 0 −B,w h i c hi se q u a t i o n
3.
Welfare is higher if consumers obtain all the transmission capacity. Therefore
it is optimal to forbid the monopolist to buy the transmission rights.
The results are opposite to the ones found by Gilbert, et al., (2002) who
state that arbitrators will outbid the monopolist.1
Case II. The consumers play strategically. They organize themselves and
take into account their inframarginal rents. Their valuation for transmission
rights is now equal to:
V C
strategic = U(pC)+k(p − cL) − U(pM) (4)
1Page 9: ￿A monopolist (n=1) would not buy any transmission contracts ￿
4with U(p)=
R ﬂ p
p q(t)dt, the net consumer surplus, and ﬂ p the reservation price.
It is the diﬀerence of the consumers surplus in both allocations. In the ￿gures
V C
strategic = A − A0. Consumers have a higher valuation than the monopolist.
V M <VC
strategic (5)
The proof follows directly from the fact that welfare is higher if transmission
rights are allocated to consumers. (A + B>A 0 + B0). Rearranging the terms
implies that B0 − B<A− A0 which is precisely equation 5.
Note that if consumers can coordinate in the transmission market (i.e the
￿rst stage), it would be natural to assume that they would do the same in the
electricity market (the second stage). Here we assumed that consumers always
behave competitively in the second stage.
Conclusion The paper considers a small, high cost, and monopolistic region,
that imports electricity from a large, low cost, and competitive region. Import
capacity is limited by transmission constraints, and transmission capacity is
auctioned to consumers and to the monopolist.
We show that if consumers arbitrate on the price diﬀerence between the
two regions, the monopolist buys the transmission capacity. Forbidding the
monopolist to buy importing capacity is welfare improving. However, as shown
in Joskow and Tirole (2000), it is very diﬃcult to generalize these conclusions
in a meshed network and variable demand.
If the consumers act strategically in the transmission market, they have a
higher valuation than the monopolist, and buy the transmission rights. For this
to happen, consumers need coordination to overcome free-riding. If a consumer
buys transmission rights, he reduces the electricity price in the importing region,
and creates an positive external bene￿t for other consumers.
References
[1] Gilbert, K., Neuhoﬀ, K., and Newbery, D. (2002). ￿Allocating transmission
to mitigate market power in electricity networks.￿ CMI Working Paper 07,
Cambridge University .
[2] Joskow, P. L. and Tirole, J. (2000). ￿Transmission rights and market power
on electric power networks.￿ Rand Journal , 31(3), 450-487.
5   





The Center for Economic Studies (CES) is the research division of 
the Department of Economics of the Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven. The CES research department employs some 100 people. 
The division Energy, Transport & Environment (ETE) currently 
consists of about 15 full time researchers. The general aim of ETE 
is to apply state of the art economic theory to current policy 
issues at the Flemish, Belgian and European level. An important 
asset of ETE is its extensive portfolio of numerical partial and 
general equilibrium models for the assessment of transport, 
energy and environmental policies. 
ETE WORKING PAPER SERIES 
2003 
n° 2003-04  Willems, B. (2003), Should an incumbent generator be allowed to buy 
import transmission capacity? 
n° 2003-03  Rousseau, S. and Billiet, C.M. (2003), Using emission standards under 
incomplete compliance 
n° 2003-02  Calthrop, E., De Borger, B. and Proost S. (2003), Tax reform for dirty 
intermediate goods: theory and an application to the taxation of 
freight transport 
n°  2003-01  Pepermans, G. (2003), Simulating the restructuring of the Flemish 
electricity distribution sector 
ETE WORKING PAPER SERIES 
2002 
n°  2002-13  Willems, B. (2002), Barring consumers from the electricity network 
might improve welfare 
n°  2002-12  Mayeres, I. And Proost, S. (2002), Reforming transport pricing: an 
economist’s perspective on equity, efficiency and acceptability  
n° 2002-11  Mayeres, I. (2002), Taxes and Transport Externalities 
n° 2002-10  Franckx, L. and Kampas, A. (2002), A Note on “The Choice between 
Emission Taxes and Output Taxes under Imperfect Monitoring” 
n°  2002-09  Eyckmans, J. (2002) International Environment Agreements And 
The Case Of Global Warming 
n°  2002-08  Calthrop, E. Proost, S. (2002) Environmental Pricing in Transport 
Chapter for Handbook 4: Transport and the Environment 
n°  2002-07  De Borger, B. and Van Dender, K. (2002), Transport tax reform, 
commuting and endogenous values of time 
n° 2002-06  Franckx, L. and d’Amato, A. (2002), Multiple-task common agency with  
one fully-informed principal: implications for public policy 
n° 2002-05  Moons, E. (2002), Cost- benefit analysis of the location of new forest 
land 
n°  2002-04  Rousseau, S. and Proost, S. (2002), The Cost Effectiveness of 
Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect 
Compliance 